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counsel throughout

the

proceedings from

which

this appeal

is

taken.
3.

After

neither of

considerable

post

divorce

conflict in

which

the parties accorded much deference the provisions of

the decree, the parties reconciled and

lived together as husband

and

the parties

wife with

all three

children of

from October

31st, 1987 until May 2nd, 1988.
4.

On

May 2nd,

1988, without

notice to

Respondent, the

Appellant left the home of the parties in California and traveled
to Utah with the three children of
the Respondent of

the parties and did not advise

her whereabouts or

of the whereabouts

of the

children.
5.

Through the use of investigators the Respondent was able

to determine the whereabouts of the Appellant and
therewith the
enforce

Appellant filed an order to

the existing

existing

decree

decree and filed

which actions

formed

contemporaneous

show cause seeking to

a petition to
a basis

of

modify the
the instant

litigation.
6.

In

connection with the

hearing on Appellants

order to

show cause, the trial court granted temporary relief by restoring
custody of two
custody

of the children

and restoring

of the other child to the Appellant as had been provided

for in the original decree.
equity

to the Respondent

payment as

The trial court further reduced the

required in

the original

decree to

a money

judgment in favor of the Appellant and against the Respondent.
2

7.
seeking
the

The

Respondent thereupon

a change m

custody of the

Appellant, and requested

brought

a

counterpetition

child then in the custody of

certain other

specified relief in

the nature of attorney fees and costs expended in connection with
the Appellants alleged abduction of the minor children,
8.

After several

court entered
contacting

or

visitation of

interim hearings during

temporary orders
harming

the

which the trial

restraining the
Appellant

the minor children

and

Respondent from
from

withholding

from the Appellant;

the trial

court entered an order requiring that the parties, each
had since

remarried,

spouses to
required

a
that

to

submit themselves

psychological
all

of

the

and

and

environmental

parties

their

present

evaluation

cooperate

evaluation including the evaluation of the

of which

in

such

and
said

minor children of the

parties.
9.

The evaluation

recommended that Respondent should

have

custody of all three of the party's children.
10.

After extensive hearings

were had, the

court entered

findings of fact and conclusions of law in which the court
a substantial

change of circumstances and the

found

court did in fact

modify the original judgment and decree from which order the
Appellant appealed.
conclusions of law

A copy of the findings of fact and
and judgment and

decree are attached

and incorporated herein as by reference as Exhibit

3

M

B".

hereto

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The bindings of

1.

a trial court

will not

overturned on

appeal unless the lindings are clearly erroneous.
2made

There was ample evidence to support each of the tindings

bv the

original

court in

connection with

the modification

of the

judgment and decree,

3.

The

judgment and decree

disposition of all of
4.

There

finding of

as modified,

provides a just

the issues presented at trial.

was ample evidence

a substantial change

to support

the trial courts

of circumstances and,

in fact,

the Appellant appears to concur in that ultimate conclusion.
5.

The

Appellant, in stipulating to the value

of the parties in open court and in executing
documents
appeal

releasing her

from

the

money

interest therein,
judgment

of the home

various and sundry
waived any

entered

by

the

right to
court

in

modification of the original judgment and decree.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TRIAL

COURT RELIED

ON COMPETENT

CHANGING CUSTODY

OF THE MINOR CHILD KASEY

AWARDED

OF

CUSTODY

ALL

THREE

MINOR

EVIDENCE IN

TO THE RESPONDENT AND

CHILDREN TO

RESPONDENT;

EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT WAS AN UNFIT PARENT WHILE
RESIDING WITH HER PRESENT HUSBAND.
Notwithstanding biblical language which
trial
the

record in this case, it
trial

court,

unless

is not part of

the

is axxomatic that the findings of

clearly
4

erroneous

and

against

the

manifest weight of the evidence, will not be disturbed-

Grayson

Roper Ltd. vs. Finlinson, 139 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (1939) 1 .

The law

is also well settled that an inference of correctness attaches to
the written findings entered
must prevail

if

by the trial court which

supported by

competent

Sharp, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (1991) 2 .

by each

of the

expert

evidence Saunders

vs.

The court found support for

o± custody to the Respondent

the award

inference

witnesses, Dr.

in the evidence provided
Gary Sazama,

Dr.

Elwin

Nielsen, and Dr. Peggy Poe as well as the other professionals who
testified at the proceeding generating the
here.

Each

of

the experts

called was of

rulings appealed from
the opinion that

three children should be in the custody of Respondent
reside with
desires
expressed

him.

of the

The

court was,

children as

the desire

brooding omnipresence

to
over

no doubt,

well, each

reside

with

the entire

all

and should

influenced by

of the

the

children having

the Respondent.
proceeding

we have

As

a
the

x

.
The applicable standard of review is based on URCP 52(a)
which provides that Findings of Fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless
clearly
erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses
*.
In this case the Utah Supreme Court
held
that "an
Appellate
court does not
lightly disturb
.... the findings of
fact made by a trial
court.
If a challenge
is made to the
findings, an Appellant must marshall all evidence in favor of the
facts as found
by the trial court and then demonstrate that even
viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the court
below, the evidence is insufficient
to support the findings of
fact.
If the Appellant
fails to marshall the evidence,
the
Appellate
court assumes the record
supports the findings of the
trial court .... (at p.6)
5

present husband of
and they did
number 12,
ignores

the Appellant.

not like him
17).

the

and in fact

Appellant

findings

He did not

of

does not
the

feared him
cite

trial

like the children
(see

to the

court

in

finding

record

her

and

argument.

Respondent, not having the burden to marshall evidence to support
the findings of the trial court, will defer to those
findings as most expressive of

the relationship of Appellant and

her

Saunders vs.

spouse to

the children,

court in its judgment
properly

and based on the

awarded custody

of all

Sharp

(supra).

facts as he found

three children

The
them,

to Respondent.

See also UCA 30-3-10(2) which provides direction to the court.
POINT II:

THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ORDERS OF

THE TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT TO VISITATION RIGHTS.
The court, in

its findings of

made orders of visitation
created by
12,

18).

Though

Appellants new spouse
the arrangement

Appellant's point of view, it was the best
balancing the
perceived
Dr.

rights

of

the

was

Appellants brief,
Dr. Sazama)

not ideal

the

from

the court could do in

parties against

what

contained in the

the

court

At page 6 of

addenda filed with

the problems confronting the court (as seen by

are readily

characterizes

problems

(see findings

to be the best interest of the children.

Sazamas evaluation, as

aggressive

through 2 0 ,

tailored around the singular

the presence of

17 and

fact numbers 17

apparent.

Appellants

and sometimes

At

spouse

violent...".
6

page 6
as

the

evaluation

"demanding,
At page

13 one

hostile,
of the

children

characterizes the spouse as "dangerous"

second child is
the Appellants

at page 14 the

found to have "...fear and resentment..." toward
spouse.

The third child at page 15 mentions that

Appellants spouse "scared her".
The court, in interviewing the children, (not on the record)
could

not

having but

reinforced the
What

sensed

attitudes

expressed concerns

"S" and " T " ,

at trial.

the children

contained in

else could the court rely on?

evidence admitted

in

that

the evaluation.

Appellant has pointed to no

On the contrary,

relied heavily on by her but

her e x h i b i f R R " ,

which would have been

of little assistance to the court, were not admitted at trial and
are not found in the trial record.
POINT III:

THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT

CHILD SUPPORT WERE

AMPLY SUPPORTED BY

WITH RESPECT TO

THE EVIDENCE VIEWED

REGARD TO EVIDENCE OF CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
Upon this issue, the court found as follows;
21. As far as the financial arrangements are
concerned,
when
the parties
moved
back
together in October of 1987, they threw
away
any
previous
divorce decrees
and
any
financial obligations.
22.
The Defendant
reshuffled
the
family
wealth,
she presently
has neither
the
capacity
nor the ability
to make meaningful
child support payments.
After the
expected
child
is born
of
her present
union,
Defendant
may go back to work
but she will
probably be unable to make enough to support
her
household
and
make
significant
contributions to the support of
the children
of the parties but will have resources after
she receives her home equity.
7

WITH

23.
The Plaintiff
is not entitled to back
child support in the light of his use, at no
cost
to him, of Defendant's equity
in the
home of the parties.
Upon Plaintiff paying
to the Defendant the stipulated
amount of
£25,000.00 the Plaintiff shall be entitled no
380.00 per month
until the youngest
child
attains the age of 18 years.
The nominal child support awarded to Respondent

<.S80.00 per month

for all three children) is certainly warranted by the findings
cited hereinabove.
POINT IV:
TRIAL COURT
FOUND

IN VIEW OF EVIDENCE OF CHANGED

WAS JUSTIFIED IN

AND APPELLANT

CIRCUMSTANCES THE

AWARDING JUDGMENT

WAIVED HER RIGHT

TO APPEAL

IN THE

AMOUNTS

FROM THE MONEY

JUDGMENT, THE PARTIES HAVING STIPULATED TO THAT ISSUE.
The

court found, in finding 23

cited at page 7 above, that

the parties had stipulated to the judgment figure. Appellant does
not

deny her

stipulation

and

an

cannot but

admit

that

the

judgment is now satisfied.
POINT V:
IN CONTEMPT OF

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
PRIOR COURT ORDERS

WAS WARRANTED

WAS NOT

BY ALL OF

THE

EVIDENCE.
The

only suggestion of contempt

not disposed of in earlier

proceedings is addressed by the court at finding number 28;
Of the principals,
if
any
party
is in
contempt of court orders heretofore existing,
it is the stepmother.
The court
has no
jurisdiction
to make a finding
of contempt
for the stepmothers actions, which
the court
finds to not be attributable to Plaintiff.

S

Appellant is

unable to point to

facts in the record

that would

require a different disposition of the issue.
POINT

VI:

THERE IS

NO EVIDENCE

THAT THE

HONORABLE JOHN

WAHLQUIST WAS BIASED AND PREJUDICED WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS OF THE
PARTIES.
There is no suggestion on the record that bias, prejudice or
predisposition of the judge was attendant to these proceedings
and the disposition of the issues is in no way compelling to that
conclusion.

The statement

in Appellants

brief that Respondent

had represented to the court that "his (Respondents)
gone

on a

cruise with

the judge and

that they

parents had

had everything

worked out" finds no support in the record nor is there any truth
in that assertion.
POINT

VII:

THE TRIAL

COURT DID

NOT

ERR IN

ITS RULINGS

RESPECTING ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS.
The

courts

family wealth"
claimed

by

findings
(finding

Defendant

that

Defendant had

number 2 2 ) ;
(Appellant)

that

are

"reshuffled

"the attorneys

neither

justified

reasonable" (finding number 2 0 ) ; that "the Plaintiff

considerable support in

that "each party should

the record.

all

and their own

obligations they have incurred to respective counsel..."

9

or

The ultimate finding

answer to their own costs

number 22) is manifestly correct and

fees

(Respondent)

..- does not have the present ability to pay attorneys fees"
find

the

(finding

within the evidence.

CONCLUSION
While this court has before it a case containing
and complex factual
trial

judge

was

basis, the disposition
both

thoughtful

and

overwhelming support in the record; a
by Appellant

and

contentions.

This

which citation

does

court should affirm

an unusual

of the issue
judicious

by the

and

finds

record only sparsely cited
nothing to

support

tijle\ruling of

her

the trial

j udgeRESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i 4

~^L

d a y \ fof A f c n l ,

1991
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A. W. Lauritzen (1906)
Attorney for Plaintiff
326 North 100 East
P.O. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone:
(801) 753-3391
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CACHE STATE OF UTAH

vs.

'.>
t
:)
>
;»

SHELLY H. NIELSON (MARTIN),

:

KIRK THOMAS NIELSON,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
RESPECTING PETITION TO
MODIFY DECREE AND
COUNTERPETITION

' • 3•

Defendant.

Civil No.862025336

*

Thia matter came on
a the hour

of 10:00 a.m. before the

the courtroom at Logan,
and 9th

for healing or the 8th day of June 1989

days

finally heard

of June
to

witnesses having

a

Utah and proceeainga were had on the 8th
and

adviaed

in

the hearing

concluaion on

been aworn and

having heard the teatimony
received and

ho iorable John Wahlquiet in

the

waa adjourned
22nd day

having teatified and

and exhibita having been

the court having examined the
the premiaea

of

the

co irt now

and

waa

June

and

the court

offered and

aame and being fully

makes

and

entera the

following;
FINDINLS OF FACT
1.
marital

The parties divorced on Kirch 31, 1987; reaumed an extra
relationehip

on

or

aboit

Oc.ober

31

1987,

finally

separated on or about May 2nd, 1988.

EXHIBIT B

2.

Each of the partiea has now remarried and the children

now reside

with Plaintiff.

reaidea with

The Plaintiff

Barbara B. Nielaon and the

is married

to

and

Defendant is married to

and reaidea with William K. Marti i.
3.

This court haa appointed an expert and haa

reviewed the

environmental study and haa given du^ weight thereto aa the court
haa aa to other expert testimony
4.

presented.

Brandy Nielaon ia not noticeably retarded and

the court

finda her to be prettier than average, but the court is compelled
to
will

recognize that although ahe wiJIl
probably marry

difficult

time in

and

have

a

prohibly have her romancee,
family > Brandy

will

obtaining sad-—hoTaing" employment;

have

/it haviTrg-

to tho courts satisfaction i 4*et— the child has mental

hnrrn shown

deficionoioo which probably will p m s l s t into her adult
5.

To

stepfather

allow Brandy to reside with the
William K.

Martin resides

years.^^^?

Defendant while the

at Defendants

home woul^d-

roault ltrrorioua problems in Bre rTdy^e life. C C U c 3 ^ - ^ ^ ^ T v
6.

)

Jacob Nielaon ia at leaf c <^f average intelligence, brave

and is self-reliant.
and

a

substance and

relationahip

Jacob relit a heavily on Plaintiff
although he

and truat he

aome areaa, not entirely

is his

aharei?

;ith

"daddy^s boy"

for love
the close

Plaintiff; which

deserved, may deteriorate if

ia, in

Plaintiff

faila to recognize and deal with Plaintif.'s own shortcomings.
7.

To require Jacob to

leave Plaintiff and to reaide with

Defendant ia inconceivable in view of hia preaent allegiancea>a**d
2

in^JLight-of

8.
child,

Mrtr-mar^gd~-aiiLlpatrtv^

Kaaey

Nielaon appears

although

conflict.

torn

Kasey

oho trusts her

for the stopf^athea

by

her

to be

a bright,

parents

loves her mother but

well adjusted

obvious and

persistent

she does not trust

her^, y*^

father and relies en her stepmother for her daily

needs and subsistence.
9.

Kasey re"l±^s, not only on her £^€her and stepmother, but

upon her siblings for support an^feassurance.
be

separated from

her siblings as-^i ; will

feelings of confidence'and security.
10.

Kasey

should not

largely destroy her
""—

The Plaintiff is a strong willed, hard working man with

an ingrained self imposed obligation to support his family.
grunt" 1 y r inct>

Plaintiff hao matured
some growing up

to do.

provide support and

the-div01 cuy~but still

The
has

The oh? jrd^en '6f the parties trust him—to

he _ia_yr>ri-_r-\y—-of—t^vat trust

having provided

sjibat-ffntiTaTly all euppoi t since - the~~divorce .
11.

The

Defendant is a

complex person

who is ambivalent

regarding the outcome of these custody proceedings.
had a equal chance with the i^hi 1 rlrnn. bnt hftw
end—ignored

hrer

Opportunlti se te

r«1 nt innjLhj_n__ with—the—ehi-ldrex^
jch4rJLdien Irave little trust
as any child would

reconstruct

She

Inrgply d 1 ffv-Qg-^H^H
and—advance

3

her_

fnrem-—their experience—-b*ve-

for Defendant although they

love its mother.

has not

love her

12.

The stepfather, William K. Nartin, wants to win this

case, not for concern for the children, bu_ only because he likes
bo win.

He is a selfish, self-centered

resort to violence under

stress.

and violent wan who will

TT>ft ch.t.dren recognised fcrhestf

braito a n d h a v e uu naryard ux x e x p e c t f o r hi**-and t h e y f e a r h i m flft

13.

Thfl

inrl h n n h a n n n n n h n r t n
support
14.
>osture

in

i Dftfpnr^rrt

! » n w K 1 * t^

nttnrri

r-nrrt-rrrt-

tho cMlJlrfm

hfty

present

husband

mlH'innt n rrptorrt ion ^ r

in thtti^r—print rnnfrnnfftt 1 r n n with t h e flt^ptfith*r•
The stepmother, Barbara

}. Nielson, occupies an unusual

in this case, having beccie-q plllai—uf support to—these

rhildren in their-othex wise uhauLic existence.
>nly rely on

the stepmother for

daily care and

The children not
sustenance, but

lave developed a strong affection for her.
15.

T&e- etepmother—has,—tO~~ ff" 3aT?e~txtenfc-y—bocomo a mother

'Ignre t<^~-4-h~ p u t 1<HH rl\l Mr'wi, a situatici
musual

in instances

such

as

this

wherj the

The

court finds

stepmother

has

^

hildren in the same age group.
16.

that the

Stepchildren alsoprt5vide

a base

of support and

ecurity for the parties^omiTdi^eji^ which would be largely

lost if

ustody were in aj
17.

Brandy should not be required

ourt has no
ensibly

practical way of

visit,

she

does

tepfather does not like

forcing this particular

not

her.

to visit Defendant, the

vike
Shr* may
4

her

stepfather

child to
and

her

visit her mother at

her

tternal grandmother's

home

if

Defendant desires

but

is

not

squired to do so in the presence of the stepfather.
18.

Defendants

visitation

>llows, at his maternal
he desires,
eaence

but he

of the

sitation

with

will be

set

grandmothers home every other
shall not

be required

stepfather and nc ad

as occurs

Jacob

shall not oc;:ur

in a

weekend,

to visit

not stay

as

in the

overnight.

Such

location other than

>gan, Utah except with his consent,
19.
her

Visitation

weekend

at

with Kasey will

the

maternal

be set

as follows, every

grandmother's

home

at

the

andmothere invitation, said visitation to be with the Defendant
id her.mother, from 6 p.m. Friday to G p.m
20.

Sunday.

No overnight visitation will be required prior

to a 60

y cooling off period from the date of this courts ruling.
21.
en
rew

As far

t h e parties
away

22.

any

The

esently has

as the financial

arrangements a r e

moved b a c k t o g e t h e r
previous

Defendant
neither

the

in October

d l v o r c e ' c f W c r c c k ^ and

reshuff .ed

the

capaci ;y nor

aningful child support payments.

family
the

concerned,

of 1 9 8 7 , they
arry

financial *

wealth,

ability

to

/.fter the expected child

rn of her present union. Defendant may go back to work but
11 probably

be unable to make enoich

she
make
is
she

to support her household

d make significant contributions tc the support of the children

5

& * - •
of

23.

the

his use, at no costs to ^him, of Defendant's equity

home

Defendant

of

the

partr.es v ^ P 0 1 1

Plaintiff

«*e—st/1 pnl nhed—--tmetmtr-af

shall be entitled

to 080.00 per

paying

tp the

$25,000.00^ ^ T e Plai-fitif f

month until tho—youngest

\

c
L^

attaino the age of 16 yaara^
24.

she recedtVfes ner

The Plaintiff is rot entitled to back child support in

the light o f
in

refl^urgftfi n****^

the parties ^ bire will H«vfi

<•

uhlld

-—

^ *

In light of his own obligations for child support

imposed by his prior marriage as well as other pressing debts, it
is doubtful whether the stapfather will be able to
his

present household in

contribute to

the foreseeable future

that Defendant,for all practical purposes, will

and it appears
be the principal

provider for herself and the expected child.
25.

The

court finds ro psychosis in any

of the principals

whether they be the Plaintiff, the Defendant, the stepfather, the
stepmother,
does not

or the

children t f the

parties and

find that the couit ordered

in this regard

evaluation is supported by

the evidence.

The

environmental

study regarding present placement of the children.

26.

court does subscribe

The court finds

attorneys

fees and

finds

thai the defendant is not entitled
that the

Defendant are neither justified
in light of

attorneys

nor reasonable.

the circumstances now

present ability

to the findings in

to pay attorneys
6

fees claimed
The

incurred by

to
by

Plaintiff,

appearing, does not
£GBB

the

have the

Defendant in

this action although Plaintiff's claimed attorneys

fees are more

in line with those justified by the nature and complexity of this
proceeding.
27.
their

Each party

should answer

own obligations they

without contribution from
not

entitled to

costs for

However if in fact

28.

to their

have incurred

and to

to respective counsel

the opposing ~-irty.
travel nor

own costs

The

:"or lost

Defendant is h
wages claimed.^^

there was & court appointed expert per se the

Of the principals, if any party is in contempt oT ccftirt

orders heretofore existing, it is the stepmother.

The court has

no jurisdiction to make a finding of contempt for the stepmothers
actions,

which

the

court

finds

to

not

be

attributable

to

Plaintiff.
29.

It is unlikely that Defendant will exercise visitation

set hereby

and will probably disappear ads

she has done at times

previous.
30.
act

There has been no kidnap^ ~ng p*Mved in this action, any

attributable to

afternoon

31.

Plaintiff

interference ^ jund—-was

The

myriad

of

parties, alone or involving
have little

was, at

recorded

best,

tnrzfgTy

merely a

justified

conversation

the present spouses of

weight or substance as evidence

Sunday

by

between

the

the

the parties,

in this hearing and

amount to nothing but pure trickery practiced on the Plaintiff by

Defendant and her present spouse killlaw K. Martin.
32.

The

attorneys

becax€

personally

conflict between the parties; counsel for the
to extricate

himself from

this unseemly

involved

in

the

Plaintiff was able

behavior

at an

early

stage while counsel for the Defendant never has.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now

makes and

enters the following;
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
custody

The Plaintiff
and control of

is a £iv. and
each o

proper person for the

t le three

care

minor children of the

parties; Brandy Nielson, Kirk J icob Nielson and Kasey

Nielson

subject only to reasonable visitation ir the Defendant and should
be awarded custody of Kasey N i e U c i .
2.

All

undisturbed^

3.

other

prior

^jstod/

the—Plaintiff should

orders

should

t4*e*N;by enjoy

The D^f^ndant, while residir g^iiith

William K. Martin, is r*ot a fit pep^on

remain

custody- of all

her present spouse,

for the care, custody and

control of the minor childre>><6randy Nielson, Kirk Jacob Nielson,
and

Kasey

Nielson and/visita .ioft\must take

undesirability of

^exposure

of the

chilcfr^

into
to the

account the
stepfather

William K. Martin.
4.

While Defendant reside { with William K. Martin and until

further order

of

this

cou$/t,\De::endant

visitation not to exceed t*ie follbfing;
8

\

should

enjoy

limited

Brandy should not

be required to

unless governed by her own desires.
in

her

maternal

grandmothers

Erandy may

home

without

visit Defendant
visit her mother
interference

by

Plaintiff but not in the presence of the stepfather.
Visitation with J \cob

b.
his

maternal

grandmothers

desires, but should not

ho ie

should be set as
every

other

follows, at

weekend,

be req illsd to visit in the

if

he

presence of

the stepfather and need not stay overnight.
c.
every

Visitation with Kaney should be set as follows,

other weekend

at

the maternal

invitation and with the Defendant and/<?

grandmothers home

at her

her mother, from

6 p.m.

Friday to 6 p.m. Sunday.
5.

Plaintiff

minor children

should provide a 1

support for

of the parties until the

paid by

the

Plaintiff

having

neither

the

to Defendant;
ability

nor

each of the

amount of 025,000.00 is
the

Defendant

resources

to

presently
contribute

significant support to the children of the parties.
S.

The

Defendant,

through

her

actions,

has

largely

dissipated the wealth of the p e r t e s ^ rend<M?Hir«g 1L impossible for
Plaintiff to r-^feririre
encumfeeir±Trg-^tlTe
pcgupled_by

LJiu judymt nL 'in

favor—of the

Defendant now

lands jointly owr."ed by~ttie—pai Lies wliiuh is now"

P1*H nt-.J-f-f mnd

th**

r-h< IHr^n nf

borrow £oney

gn

Uve parfcicrBr:
r)f*for\Anr>tf\ equity

TTve"

Plaintiff can,

however,

tranfiffirred to

hi* and he siuuld do SO"witnin 3U days and pay to"

^Defendant $25,000.00 u p a f t - = ^ g g § B E B i l b ^ a t g j j T g J ^ ^

i#-

7.
above,

Upon transfer and
Defendant

Plaintiff
persist

shall,

the sum

until

frhft

payment as set forth
for

<ach

month

in paragraph 6

thereafter

of seo.OO/ger^^Tilld aupporE

pay

to

said payment t o — -

yrmng*>« + p L t l A * + *• m i n » X * * g * of

IQ y g a r s

Qi'^bfl

jotharwi-serngmonclpated.
8.

Plaintiff,

recover from

by his

actions, has

Defendant any loss or expanse

of the separation*
of the family

forgone the

right to

incurred as a result

reconciliation and ultimate violent

bonds which have

severing

pre< ipitated the hearing

on the

petition and counterpetition now before the court.
9.
10.

There should be no contempt adjudged against any party.
Each party

necessarily

should

incurred by them

DATED this

pay the

attorneys £e&&

and

.n prosecution of this action

day of

, 1989.

DJSTRICT

APPROVED AS TO FORM
John Walsh, attorney
for Defendant

nielson 12/07
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Grayson Roper I "mited Partnership v. Finlinson

29

19 Utah Adv. Rep. 29
of an eighty-acre parcel described as the south 1/
assume that the legislature intended a fair resuU
2 of the southwest 1/4 of section 34, township 15
Reversed.
south, range 4 west, Salt Lake Base and Meridian
(SLBM). Roper acquired this property in 1971 and
WE CONCUR: can trace a clear chain Qf title back to the patentee
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
who acquired the land from the federal govern, I. Daniel Stewart, Justice
ment in 1916. The land owned by Finlinson pertiMichael D. Zimmerman, Justice *
. »
nent to this action is a forty-acre parcel immed*
Howe, Associate Chief Justice, concurs in'
iately
to the east of Roper's property. Finlinson
the result.
acqured this parcel in 1963. It is described as the
southwest 1/4 of the southeast 1/4 of section
1. The current version of the statute reflects mr.or 34, nwnship 15 south, range 4 west, SLBM. Fingrammatical changes made in 1986.
linsor, can trace a clear chain of title back to the
2. Section 70A-1-104 provides: "This act be a. a pater *ee who acquired the land from the federal
general act intended as a unified coverage >f its gov JO ment. The dispute between Roper and Finsubject matter, no part of it shall be deemed «. be lins. concerns a strip of land approximately 129
impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation if Such feet 'ide, lying within the bounds of Roper's
construction can reasonably be avoided. *
prope .y but on its eastern boundary. It is described as the east 129.4 feet of the south 1/2 of the
southwest 1/4 of section 34, township 15 south,
tnge4west,SLBM,
^
Cite as
For
many
years,
a
road
extended the length of
119 Utah Adv. Rep. 29
>ie 129-foot-wide strip, in a north/south direction and provided access from the town of LeaIN THE SUPREME COURT
mington to what is now known as Utah Highway
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
No. 125. Roper and his predecessors in interest
used this road and allowed others to do the same.
GRAYSON ROPER LIMITED
For many years, a fence stood along the west side
PARTNERSHIP and Grayson Roper,
of the strip. In 1979,' Finlinson plowed out the
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
road and began farming the strip of land. Roper
v.
asked Finlinson to cease this activity, but Finlinson
Rich FINLINSON, Jos. T. Finlinson, n c , a
refused. In May of 1982, the Bureau of Land
corporation, Gordon Nielson, and Jor I Doe1
Management ("the BLM") resurveyed the southern
I, -'
*
" ;. ' '•* '
boundary line of section 34, as well as other boundaries in the area. The BLM then placed a survey
Defendants and Appellants.
marker to establish the. southeast corner of the
No. 860171
southwest 1/4 of section 34. This survey marker
f
was located 129.4 feet to the east of the old fence
FILED: October 17,1989
next to the now-plowed-up road. In September
of 1982, Roper erected a partial fence, on, Xhe
Fourth District, Millard County
• sect on boundary « as established by the -newly
Honorable George E. Ballif
\ , l% .
pla<ed BLM marker. Finlinson removed the fence,
ATTORNEYS:
informed Roper that he owned the land, and
Fred W. Finlinson, Salt Lake City, for
wa^ied him to « keep off the property or face t a
appellants'
transaction.
v
Ui j n . ^ t .
(*- May of 1983, Roper filed a,quiet title action
Eldon A. Eliason, Delta, for appellees
:a£& ist Finlinson, requesting injunctive ,relief and
dam ges. Finlinson defended by, contending that
This opinion is subject to revision before
Rop r's suit was barred by the statute Qf limitat• , publication in the Pacific R porter, i
ions in the Utah Code that pertains,.to actions
involving title to real property. See Utah, Code
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Defendants Rich Finlinson, JQS. T. Finlinson, Ann. §§78-12-5,-6 (1987)./ The ,sections
Inc., a corporation,» Gordon Nielson, and John relied on, 78-12-5 and -6, r state ^ as a precondDoc 1 (hereinafter i collectively referred to as ition to the bringing of an action concerning title
"Finlinson") appeal from a trial court decision that to real property that the plaintiff, counterdftimant,
quiets title of a strip of land in plaintiffs Grayson or its predecessor in interest must have been, in
Roper Limited Partnership and Grayson Roper possession of the .property within seven,1 years
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Roper"). before the commencement of the action. The
Finlinson claims the court erred in ruling that plaintiff or counterclaimant need not prove actual
Roper's quiet title action was not barr i by sect- possession to satisfy ."this requirement.- .Under
ions 78-12-5 and-6 of the Code ant in refu- •section 78-12-7 of the Code, ,a i party holding
sing to find that Finlinson had gained tie to the legal title to the property is presumed to. be "in
disputed land through boundary by ac uiescence. possession" within the meaning of sections 78-125 and-6. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-7 (1987).2
The trial court decision is affirmed.
However,
section 78-12-7 also provides that this
Roper and Finlinson are adjacent Ian own rs in
Millard County, Utah. Roper is the re >rd wner presumption can be rebutted if it is shown, that
"the property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the
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,
19 Utah Adv Rep. 29
Provo. Uuh
commencement of the action." Id.
tMnpted to carry his burden of marshaling the
* The trial court heard conflicting evideice and .vii ence in support of the trial, court's finding
ruled in favor of Roper. It found, inter aha, that
egarcjing mutual use of the strip and then demo(i) Roper was the record title owner of n-e dispistranng that that finding is clearly erroneous. See,
uted strip of land; (ii) both Roper and Finlinson
e.g., kartell, 116 P.2d at 886. Therefore, there is
regularly used the road on the disputed strip and no re? .on for us to disturb that finding. SecAshton v.
both more recently claimed exclusive possession of
n, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987).
f\sht
the land; (iii) the boundaries of Roper's property
Bu' even if Finlinson or his predecessors in intwere established by three United States survey
rest lad exclusively possessed the disputed strip
teams, as well as two Millard County surveyors; ior i ore than seven years before Roper brought
(iv) the BLM survey or* 1982 confirmed the boun- his s t, that fact would not operate to rebut the
daries of Roper's property^ and (v) Roper had presu iption of possession accorded Roper by
paid taxes on the contested strip of land for twelve sectii i 78-12-7. Relying on sections 78-12-9
years and his predecessors in interest had done the and-1 of the Code,3 Finlinson contends that it
same for over fifty years. The court then held, that is en< jgh to "possess adversely" under section 78Finlinson had not established the adverse posses12-7 if one merely cultivates crops on the land.
sion claim necessary to rebut the presumption This reading of the Code is plainly erroneous.
raised -by* section 78-12-7! in favor of Roper and Sections 78-12-9 and-11 only define when
;that the statute of limitations defense asserted by
"land is deemed to have been possessed and occFinlinson failed' because Roper was' "seized or upied" by a party' seeking to * establish adverse
possessed of the property, in question within s ven
possession. They specify that cultivation of crops
yearsibefore the commencement of the action.' Id. suffices for possession or occupation. But that
It thereforel> quieted title in Roper. Finli son alone is not enough to establish a claim of adverse
appeals. WW-'
possession. Payment of "taxes is also required.
^' Before ? addressing Finlinson's arguments on
Section 78 12-12 provides: ^ \ , *|U« .
appeal, we note the applicable standards 11 review.
In no case shall adverse possession
A trial court's legal conclusions are ace >rded no
be considered established under the
particular deference; we review them for correctprovisions of any section of this code,
ness. City of West Jordan v. Utah StaL: letireunless it shall be shown that the land
ment Bd.t 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 198fc^ Scharf
has been occupied and claimed for the
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
period of seven years continuously,* and
On the other hand; a trial court's findings of fact
that the party, his predecessors . and
are given deferential review. Utah Rule ->f Civil
grantors have paid all taxes which have
Procedure 52(a) provides, "Findings cf fact,
\)een levied and assessed upon such
whether based on oral or documentary e/idence,
ind according to la w.
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-12 (1987) (emphasis
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
added >. This payment-of-taxes requirement has
trial court to judge the credibility of the witne•seen ong recognized. See, e.g., Smith v. Nelson,
sses." Utah R. Civ. P.' 52(a). To successfully
14 U'ah 51, 56-57, 197 P.2d 132, 135 (1948); Home
attack a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant
Owner's Loan Corp. [xv. Dudley,
105 Utah
must first marshal all the evidence in support of
'the findings and then demonstrate that the evid- 208, 20-21, 141 P.2d 160,166-67 (1943); Huntsman
v.
untsmant
56 U t a h 6 0 9 , 6 1 9 - 2 0 ,
ence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
J
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings 192 F 368,372(1920), . . , - * , .
Wt read the words "possess adversely" in
against an attack under the rule 52(a) standard. Reid
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, sectic i 78-12-7 as having the same meaning as
"adverse possession" in section 78-12-12,
899 (Utah 1989); In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d
thereby importing into section 78-12-7 a requi'885, 886 (Utah 1989).
Finlinson does not dispute that Roper is the rement that all of the elements of adverse possesrecord title owner of the section which includes the sion be shown to rebut the presumption of possession it raises in a record title owner. To hold
disputed strip of land and that that fact raisfd a
otherwise, as Finlinson requests, would be to
presumption of possession in Roper under se Mon
78-12-7. However, Finlinson contends that the permit a party to use section 75-12-7 to estabtrial court erred in Finding that the statutory ?re- lish de facto an entitlement to property by adverse
sumptton had not been rebutted. In support of this possession without showing the payment of taxes
claim, Finlinson asserts that the trial court made a This result would be flatly contrary to the plain
finding that he or his predecessors in int rest occ- intent of he legislature as set out in section 78-1212 and confirmed in our cases. See Fairer v.
upied the strip for over fifty years orior to
Roper's bringing the quiet title action. Ms, he Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 193-94, 271 P.2d 462,
» i-66 (1954); Sheppick v. Sheppick, 44 Utah
claims, is sufficient to show that "the pro ;e iy has
3 , 136, 138 P. 1169, 1171 (1914). Finlinson's
been held and possessed adversely to sujh legal
>c<;ition also contradicts fundamental principles of
title' for seven years before the commencement of
tatutory construction: to wit, separate parts of an
the action." Utah Code*Ann. § 78-12-7 (1987).
r
ict should not be construed in isolation from the
The factual premise on which Finlinsoi bases
est of the act, Jensen v. Intermountain Health
this argument is contrary to the trial court's
Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984), and the
finding that both Roper and Finlinson used the
terms of related code provisions should be conststrip of land over the years before claiming the
rued in a harmonious fashion, see Utah State
right to exclusive possession. Finlinson has not
UTAH ADVANCE RbPORTS
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Road Common v. Fribcrg, 687 P.24 821, ft-1
rents or profits out of the same, shall be
effectual, unless it appears that the
(Utah 1984). Because Finlinson has not shown that
person prosecuting the action, or interhe had paid taxes on the pro >erty for seven years,
posing the defense or counterclaim, or
•the trial court correctly ruleu that sections 78-12under whose title the action is prosec5 and-6 did not bar Roper's suit.
uted or defense or counterclaim is made,
• We next address Finlinson*s argument tha the
or the ancestor, predecessor or grantor
trial court erred in failing to find that he acq ired
of such person was seized or possessed
title to the disputed strip of land. through the
of the property in question within seven
doctrine .of; boundary by acquiescence. Finlihson
years before the committing of the act in
recognizes that, the, presence of clear title in Roper
respect to which action is prosecuted or
and the ready availability of accurate survey infdefense or counterclaim made.
ormation showing the true status of the strip of
Utah
Code Ann. §78-12-6 (1987).
land would require affirmance of Roper's title
2. Section 78-12-7 provides:
under oiir decision in Halladay v Cluff, 685 P.2d
500 (Utah 1984). Under Halladi /, there must tx
In every action for the recovery of
real property, or the possession thereof,
•objective uncertainty" as to a boundary's locathe person establishing a legal title to the
tion before boundary by acquif cence. can come
property shall be presumed to have been
into play. 685 P.2d at 505-06. Finlinson argues
possessed thereof within the time requthat we should limit Halladay tc an "urban scenired by law; and the occupation of the
urio,* When the. land is rural, 1 inlin on suggests,
property by any other person shall be
we should adhere to the traditii aal boundary by
deemed to have been under and in subacquiescence rule of Fuoco v. % Wiafcs, 18 Utah
ordination to the legal title, unless it
2d-282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966). nder Fuoco, the
appears that the. property has been held
four prerequisites of boundary b acquiescence are
and possessed adversely to; such legal •,
(i) occupation up to a visible line marked by
title for seven years before the commev
monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual ace
ncement of the action,
uiescence in the line as the bound in , (iii) for i
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-7 (1987);V
long period of years, (iv) by adjoining landowner .
3. Section 78-12-9 provides: ;
Id. at 284,421 P,2d at 946.
For the purpose f of constituting : an~
Even if we were to so limit Halh d< y, Finlinsr .
adverse possession by s any person clai-f
would, not, prevail here because he i nnot sat* I
ming a title founded upon a* written^
all the elements of Fuoco. The trial court. foiiii
instrument or judgment or decree,; land J
that the fence along the west side of the disputec
is deemed to have.been possessed and
strip wds built for stock c mtrol and not as a
occupied in the following cases:
boundary; therefore, it was lot acquiesced in as a
(1) where it has been, usually'iOU.lt.iv-,
boundary by both parties. Finlinson has not attea ted or improved.
mpted to carry his burden of overturning that
(2)-where'it has been - protected by: a ';
finding on appeal. • See Bartcll, 116 P.2d at 886.
substantial inclosure,
Wc • there fore . deciin e to o vert u. r n th e t rial c* . u it * s
(3) where, although not inclosed, it
has been used for the supply of fuel, or
finding on that point
of fencing timber, for the purpose of
The trial court's decision quieting title in Ropei
husbandry, or for pasturage or for the
is affirmed..
ordinary use of the occupant.
(4) where a known farm or single lot
WE CONCUR:
has been partly improved, the portion of
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
such farm or lot that may have been left
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice
not cleared or not inclosed according to
Christine M. Durham, Justice
the usual course and custom of the
Richard C. Davidson, Utah Co, n of Appeals
adjoining county is deemed to have been
Judge
occupied for the same length of time as
Howe, Associate Chief Jus* xe, ) wing
the part improved and cultivated.
disqualified liimself, does not par cipa herein;
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-9 (1.987), - Section 78Davidson, Court of Appeals Judp , sat»
12-11 provides:
p o r tj ie purpose of constituting an,
1 Section 78-12-5 provides:
adverse possession by any person claiming title not founded upon a written
No 'action for';, the recovery of real
instrument, judgment or decree, land is
property or for. the possession thereo f
deemed to have been possessed and
shall be maintained, unless it appears
occupied in the following cases only:
that the plaintiff, his ancestcr, grantor
(1) where it has been protected by a <
or predecessor was seized or j ossessed
substantial inclosure
of the property in question wth n seven
(2) 'where it has., been usually cultiv
years ' before the ' commencem«
of thc
ated or improved.
action,"
(3),where .labor.or money1 has been
Utah ••Code "Ann §78 12 5 '-(1987) Section 7fc
expended upon dams; canals, embank.12-6 provides:
ments, aqueducts or otherwise for the
No .cause .of action or defense oi
purpose of irrigating such lands amou
counterclaim to an action, founde"
nting to the sum of $5 per acre
upon the title to... real property or t
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IN T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
OF T H E STATE OF UTAH
I eon I I. SAUNDERS; Robert Felton;
Saunders Land Investment Corp., a Utah
corporation; White Pine Ranches, a UtaL
general partnership; White Pine Enterprises, a
Utah general partnership; and Kenneth h
Norton, dba Interstate Rentals, IF:: :; ^ vad
corporation,
Plaintiffs and Peti(ioners,
v.
John C. SHARP and Geraldine Y, Sharp,
Defendants and Respondents
No. 900360
FILED: February 12, 1991
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
ATTORNEYS:
Robert M. Anderson, Salt Lake Cit>, >
Leon H. Saunders, Robert Felton, «m.'
Saunders Land Investment Corp.
Glen D. Watkins, Bruce Wycoff, Salt i_a.
City, for White Pine Ranches and Whit
Pine Enterprises John B. Anderson, Sai
Lake City, for Kenneth R Nort
-\ '
Interstate Rentals
Donald I v\mde:. kathv A 1 1 ) J \ I . , .\.; •
L a k e C r *-••• • l.
• <erahJM.'
Sharp
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Apj ais
This opinion is subject to revision bed *e
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on plai tiffs'
petition for a writ of certiorari to review the
decision of the court of appeals in Saunders v
Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah Ct. App. 19S0)
The petition is granted. Further briefing by .hi
parties and oral argument are deemed unn :
essary, as the arguments in the petition bri'f,
are adequate for our determination. T .
matter is remanded to the court of appeals fo"
modification of its opinion in accordance with
this opinion.
Plaintiffs purchased approximately sixty
acres of unimproved real property from defendants under a contract which consisted of
several separate memoranda to be interpreted
together. Both parties agree that the property
was to be developed and resold in residential
lots consisting of four or five acres, as a
planned.unit development ("PUD"). Defendants, as sellers, agreed to release and convey

ep. 5

one PUD lot upon receipt of each $140,000
paid in principal. Initially, plaintiffs platted
only half the property. On December 23, 1983,
the plat of phase I of the project was recorded
in the office of the Summit County Recorder.
Six five-acre lots and a private internal
roadway were described on the plat. Defendants executed a deed to lots 1 through 5, as
requested by plaintiffs, pursuant to the release
clause of the contract.
Plaintiffs breached the contract by making
only a partial payment on the real property
taxes in November 1984. In addition, they
were able to pay only a portion of the 1985
annual payment. Nevertheless, they state that
they previously paid sufficient principal to
cover 'he purchase price of the platted lot 6,
all of the internal roadway of phase I, and
7.35 a.:res of the unplatted acreage. Plaintiffs
claim that under the release clause of the
contra t, they are entitled to the release of all
prop rt/ paid for, in spite of their prior
bread. By their complaint, plaintiffs sought
convey* ice of these areas by specific performance <f the contract. Defendants countei claimed for foreclosure.
' T he trial court found that the contract
rec lired plaintiffs to designate the property to
be conveyed pursuant to the release clause,
anc plaintiffs had never requested conveyance
of any property except the first five platted
lots. In its statements of applicable law, the
trial court stated that plaintiffs' breaches were
material, significant, and continuing and were
uncured when plaintiffs requested release of
the roadway, lot 6, and the additional 7.35
acres from the unplatted property. Accordingly, the trial court denied specific performance and granted judgment to defendants.
Plaintiffs appealed, and the matter was pouredover to the Utah Court of Appeals for review.
On appeal, plaintiffs reiterated their claim
that they are entitled, under the contract, to
conveyance of all property paid for, in spite of
their breach of the contract by nonpayment of
the entire purchase price. The court of appeals
interpreted the argument as a challenge to the
findings of fact made by the trial court. In its
opinio , the court of appeals made this statement:
?'• >:c b i n ers have not marshaled the
</v fence in support of those finding, but merely argue that there is
evic snee contradicting them, they
have failed to demonstrate that the
findings are against the clear weight
of the evidence. We must therefore
accept the findings as valid and
a (firm the judgm en t.
793 P.2d at 931 (emphasis added).
As far as its review of plaintiffs' challenges
to the findings of fact is concerned, the court
of appeals was correct. An appellate court
does not lightly disturb the verdict of a jurv

u
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nor the findings of fact made by a trial court.
If a challenge is made to the findings, an
appellant must marshal all evidence in favor
of the facts as found by the trial court and
then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court
below, the evidence is insufficient to support
the findings of fact. If the appellant fails to
marshal the evidence, the appellate court
assumes that the record supports the findings
of the trial court and proceeds to a review of
the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions
of law and the application of that law in the
case. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782
P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Scharf v, LMG
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
However, the court of appeals erred when it
then automatically affirmed the judgment
based on plaintiffs' failure to show ne findings of fact to be unsupported. An apellate
court is to review the trial court's COP > isions
of law for correctness. Landes v. Cap i A City
Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990;t Once
the findings of fact (rather than the jucgment)
were affirmed by the appeals court, it was
then incumbent on that court to review the
trial court's conclusions of law and its application of the law to the facts as found. The
interpretation of a contract is a matter of law
for the court to determine unless the contract
is ambiguous and evidence of the parties'
intent (which is a matter of fact) is necessary
to establish the terms of the contract. The
court of appeals failed to analyze the law
applicable to the case, and the case is therefore remanded to the Utah Court of Appeals
for that purpose.
So ordered.
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IN THE SUPREME CO! lrR;"I
OF THE STATE OF U I AH
Vcrr ssa REED,
iMainlifi and Appellee,
\.
Keith REED, Merrill W. Reed, Georga Reed
and John Does 1 through 15,
TVr '.hum an • \ppellant.
No. Win**
FILM): February 14, 19Vi
Fourth district, Utah County
Honorat e Cullen Y. Christcnsen
ATI ORNEYS:
": ry J. Anderson, Michael K. Black, Richard
S. Johnson, Orem, for appellant
"jvin Ellis, 1 lurricane, for appellee
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
HAL Lf Chief Justice:
D e f e n d a n t K e i t h Reed (h e r e i n a f t e i
defendant") appeals the trial court's order
nd judgment denying a motion to quash
servi » of summons upon him and the default
judg lent entered against him.
PI intiff and defendant were granted a
divor :e on April 15, 1987, in the Fourth
Judic al District Court, Utah County. Under
the terms of the divorce, plaintiff was awarded
items of personal property, including a travel
trailer and a four-wheel-drive pickup truck,
neither of which was surrendered to plaintiff
in a timely manner. The trailer was eventually
returned to plaintiff by defendant's parents,
Merrill Reed and Georga Reed, also named
defendants in this matter.
On Mav 8, 1988, in an effort to recover the
pickup v. uck, plaintiff caused the sheriff to
serve the subject summons upon defendant
and his parents at his parents' home in Orem,
Utah, where defendant had resided during the
jc.dency of the divorce. At the time of
5 *r/ice, the sheriff was informed by the
raients that defendant no longer lived at the
residence and that they did not know where he
vas but thought he was out of the state. The
sheriff nevertheless left defendant's copy of
the summons at the parents' home and com
pletec a return of service.
On May 25, 1988, defendant appeared specially and filed a motion to quash service. He
, eluded with the motion affidavits from
himsc'f and his parents stating that he did not
live v.ith his parents and that the service m
proce.s was not made at his -^-; »i •-•*•*•• ••-•

UTAH ADVANCE RErORTS

1041

HUSBAND AND WIFE

(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider,
among other factors the court finds relevant, which
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the
child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the
court finds appropriate
1988

3O.;!-I.K

p solution method before seeking enforeemuLi ..
modification of the terms and conditions of the order
of joint legal custody through litigation, except in
emergency situations requiring ex. part** '^de^ t
protect the child.
*»**

30-3-10.3. 1 e r m s of" j o i n t legal custoti> .#»viw
(1) An order of joint legal custody shall provide
terms the court determines appropriate, which may
include specifying:
(a) either the county of residence of the child,
until altered by further order of the court, or the
custodian who has the sole legal right to determine the residence of the child;
ib) that the parents shall exchange information concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions concerning any of these
areas;
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regardi ig the child's present and future physical care,
s lpport, and education;
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the
c 'Id's attendance at school and other activities,
nij daily routine, and his association with
i ends; and
e) as necessary the remaining parental rights,
pr vileges, duties, and powers to be exercised by
30-3-10.2. J o i n t leuni ru.stoJ\ ord**i - l-actor*
thv parents solely, concurrently, or jointly,
for court tu i> > nji-uiti.-.
«'i,Ui« as(2) The court shall, where possible, include in the
sistance.
o der the terms agreed to between the parties.
(1) The court may order joint legal custody if it
3) Any parental rights not specifically addressed
determines that joint legal custody is in the best
b the court order may be exercised by the parent
interest of the child and:
in'ving physical custody of the child the majority of
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal
the time.
custody; or
(4) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians
tb) both parents appear capable of implementdoes not impair or limit the authority of the court
ing joint legal custody.
to order support of the child, including payments
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a
by one custodian to the other.
child will be served by ordering joint custc iy, the
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is
court shall consider the following factors:
not grounds for modifying a support order.
(a) whether the physical, psychologic 1, and
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute resoluemotional needs and development of th • child
tion procedure the parties agree to use before seeking
will benefit from joint legal custody;
enforcement or modification of the terms and condi(b) the ability of the parents to give fir? . priortions of the order of joint legal custody through litigaity to the welfare of the child and reach shar d
tion, except in emergency situations requiring ex
decisions in the child's best interest;
parte orders to protect the child,
ia^s
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a positive relation.' lip be30-3-10.4.
Modification
or
termination
of
order.
tween the child and the other parent;
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal
(d) whether both parents participated n raiscustodians the court may, after a hearing, modify an
ing the child before the divorce;
order that established joint legal custody if:
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or
the parents;
b >th custodians have materially and substan(0 the preference of the child if the child 's ol
tially changed since the entry of the order to be
sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to o: m
\i> dified, or the order has become unworkable or
an intelligent preference as to joint legal cus' ^ y;
i lppropriate under existing circumstances; and
(g) the maturity of the parents and their v;.Jib) a modification of the terms and conditions
ingness and ability to protect the child from conof he decree would be an improvement for and m
flict that may arise between the parents; and
th best interest of the child.
(h) any other factors the court finus relevant.
(2) The order of joint legal custody shall be termi(3) The determination of the best intc rest of the
ni ted by order of the court if both parents file a mochild shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.
ti n for termination. At the time of entry of an order
(4) The court shall inform both parties that an orte minating joint legal custody, the court shall enter
der for joint custody may preclude eligibility for pubaii. order of sole legal custody under Section 30-3-10.
lic assistance in the form of aid to families with deAll related issues, including visitation and child suppendent children, and that if public assistance is required for the support of children of the parties at any
port, shall also be determined and ordered by the
time subsequent to an order of joint legal custody, the
court.
order may be terminated under Section 30-3-10.4.
(3) If the court finds that an action under this sec(5) The court may order that where possible the
tion is filed or answered frivolously and in a manner
parties attemm to sett.lp fntnrp Hisnnfpc hv n ^iennto
30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined
In this chapter, "joint legal custody":
(1) means the sharing of the rights, pr /iieges,
duties, and powers of a parent by both rarents,
where specified;
(2) may include an awaru •»! cwciu.-.w .nihility by the court !< , m- pan-m ; . nuiKi- ptv v
decisions;
(3) does not affect the physical custod. of the
child except as specified in the order of jo *it legal
custody;
(4) is not based on awarding equal or nearly
equal periods of physical custody of and access to
the child to each of the parents, as the best int. rest of the child often requires that a prime *y
physical residence for the child be d e s i g m t . d ;
and
(5) does not prohibit the court from specif y\ ^g
one parent as the primary caretaker and ;<\e
home as the primary residence of the child. 1988
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JUDICIAL CODE

(d) carry out duti.es prescribed by the Suprenv
Court and the Judicial Council.
(51 Filing fees for the Court of Appeals an ilias for the Supreme Court.
:--

78-3-4
CHAPTER 3
D l S F K k '1 C O U R T S

Section
* .'»-1 {'• '/.-.;• J. repealed.
~ '> •'l e r m of j u d g e s — V a c a n c y .
^»2a-3. C o u r t of A p p e a l s j u r i s d i c t i o n .
•- -•;
jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cii . til The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to i*su<
cuit court — Appeals.
ill extraordinary writs and to issue al' writs ami pi;
Repealed.
mm necessary:
7^ 3 o.
.'errns — Minimum, of once quarterly.
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, ordei.7.-3-7 tu 7 8 - r - l l . Repealed.
and decrees; or
- "i-1 i "•
State District Court Administrative Sys(b) in aid of its jurisdiction
tem — Primary and secondary county
l2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
locations.
tftduding jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
78-3-12.
Repealed.
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
78-3-12.~.
Costs of system.
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
78-3-13.
Repealed.
or appeals from the district court review of infor78-3-13.4.
Counties joining court system — Procemal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, exdure — Facilities —- Salaries.
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
Commission. Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
78-3-14.5.
Allocation of d i s t n c : court fees and
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
fine.
(b) appeals from the district court review o
78-3-15, 78-3-16. Repealed
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies < f 78-3-16.5.
Fees for filing and other seivices or a*
political subdivisions of the state or other h
tions.
cal agencies; and
78-3-17.
Repealed
(ii) a challenge to agency actioii und<
78-3-17.5.
Application ot s;i-. mL*> . ; . J - U . : I . !• - ...
Section 63-46a-12.1;
ties.
', -3-18.
Judicial Admmi •• »M:; - I -\. ;
St. n :
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
tie
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
1
78-3-P
Purpose of act
those from the small claims department of a ci 7-- -3 -lii!
Definitions.
w i t court;
i6-3-21
Judicial Council — Creation — Mern
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
bers — Terms and election — Responrecord in criminal cases, except those involving ;\
sibilities — Reports.
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
7 3-3-22.
Presiding officei — Compensation (0 appeals from district court in crimin«H
Duties.
cases, except those involving a conviction .
^3-3-23.
Administrator of the courts — Appointfirst degree or capital felony;
ment — Qualifications — Salary.
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex"3-3-24.
Jourt administrator — Powers, duties,
traordinary writs sought by persons who are inand responsibilities
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen78-3-25.
Assistants for administrator of the
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
courts — Appointment of trial court
a conviction of or the sentence for a first d gree
executives.
or capital felony;
78-3-26.
Courts to provuii m:. rmai'.c;: an<: st,(h) appeals from district court involving dotistical dai.i ;• ;u:m:mst:Mi-i . - tr.
mestic relations cases, including, but not limited
courts
to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
78-3-27.
Annual judicial . unierence.
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and pater78-3-28.
Repealed.
78-3-29.
Presiding judge — Election — Term —
nity;
Compensation — Powers — Duties.
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
78-3-30
Duties of the clerk of the district court.
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
78-3-31.
Court commissioners — Qualifications
from the Supreme Court.
— Appointment — Functions gov
[3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only
erned by rule.
pttdby the vote of four judges of the court may certif
iji the Supreme Court for original appellate revie 78-3-1 to 7«-3 ..
1971, 1981, 1968
MHhi determination any matter over which the Com
M Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
78-3-3. l e r m of judges* — V a c a n c y .
|^ (4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the i
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed iniifitrcments of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review t
i illy until the first general election held more than
ig»ncv adjudicative proceedings.
it)!
' iree years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office for judges of the
'-'RMa-4. Review of a c t i o n s by S u p r e m e Cour ,
district courts is six years, and commences on the
k Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of tl ;
first Monday in J a n u a r y , next following the date of
(mul of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of cert.election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
i to the Supreme Court.
IBFI
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is
a o pointed a i d q u a 1 i f I e d,
1988
:H»2a-5. L o c a t i o n of C o u r t of A p p e a l s .
n The Court of Appeals has its principal location in
'. 8-3-4. J u r i s d i c t i o n
Alii Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform
T r a n s i e r oi euM-> t*
c it c o u r t « r r of its functions in any location within the state.

R u l e 52. F i n d i n g s by t h e c o u r t .
(a) Effect. In all actions cried upon the facts without a jury or with an advi; ory jury, the court snail
find the facts specially and -tate separately its conclusions of law thereon, an- judgment ?" all be entered pursuant to Rule 58A : n grantin ; nr refusing
interlocutory injunctions the ^ourt shall r nilarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions ot law which
constitute the grounds of its pction. Reqr*es s for findings are not necessary for purposes of ?eview. Findings of fact, whether based »>n oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to UIQ opp< rtunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of ne witnesses. The findings of a master, to th* ext> nt that
the court adopts them, shall be considers i as Jie findings of the court. It will be sufficient if t. e fn lings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of .he evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings
on motions, except as provided in Rule 41<D). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) A m e n d m e n t . Upon motion, of a party made not
later than 10 days after entry o r judgment the court
may amend its findings or makt additional findings
and may amend the judgment a cordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are m a d t in
actions tried by the court wi hout a jury, the ques y ion
of the sufficiency of the evi( *nce to support the findings may thereafter be ra* icj whether or not the
party raising the question l.-\ made ir *ie district
court an objection to such fir cKigs or ha.c n ade either
a motion to amend them, a motion for ju I r ment, or a
motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact a n d c o n c l u s i o n s
of l a w . Except in actions for divorce, fir dnigs of fact
and conclusions of law may l>e waived b / the parties
to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the
trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed H th» cause;
(3) by oral consent in open cour , en >red in
the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan.. 1, 1987.)
R u l e 53. M a s t e r s .
(a) A p p o i n t m e n t a n d c o m p e n s a t i o n . Ar> r or all
of the issues in an action may be referred by tl 3 court
to a master upon the written consent of the pa. ties, or
the court may appoint a master in an action, in accordance with the provisions of Subdivision (b) of this
rule. As used in these rules the word "master" includes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner. The
compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed
by the court, and shall be charged upon such of the
parties or paid out of any fund or ubject matter of the
action, which is in the custody and control of the
court as the court may direct. T .e master shall not
retain his report as security for his compensation; hut
when the party ordered to j ly the compensation allowed by the court does no pay it after notice and
within the time prescribed b; the court, the master is
entitled to a writ of executior eainst thy1 -delinquent

jury, a reference shall be made only when the i m §
are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jiajjj
save in matters of account, a reference shall, in tfcf
absence of the written consent of the parties, be m a l l
only upon a showing that some exceptional conditim
requires it.
;
(c) P o w e r s . The order of reference to the majUf
may specify or limit his powers and may direct him I t
report only upon particular issues or to do or perfom
particular acts or to receive and report evidence oojy
and may fix the time and place for beginning an!
closing the hearings and for the filing of the masttdl
report. Subject to the specifications and limitation*
stated in the order, the master has and shall exerdflfc
the power to regulate all proceedings in every he***
ing before him and to do all acts and take all mtmi
sures necessary or proper for the efficient perfor*
mance of his duties under the order. He may requift
the production before him of evidence upon all masters embraced in the reference, including the produc*
tion of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, a a i
writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon tb#
admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed bjr
the order of reference and has the authority to po!
witnesses on oath and may himself examine the»
and may call the parties to the action and examinf
them upon oath. When a party so requests, the ma*
ter shall make a record of the evidence offered an!
excluded in the same manner and subject to the sam*
limitations as provided in the Utah Rules of Evidenof
for a court sitting without a jury.
(d) P r o c e e d i n g s .
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, tht
clerk shall forthwith furnish the master with a
copy of the order of reference. Upon receipt
thereof unless the order of reference otherwiw
provides, the master shall forthwith set a tin**
and place for the first meeting of the parties or
their attorneys to be held within 20 days afler
the date of the order of reference and shall notify
the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of th*
master to proceed with all reasonable diligence
Either party, on notice to the parties and master,
may apply to the court for an order requiring tht
master to speed the proceedings and to make hb
report. If a party fails to appear at the time and!
place appointed, the master may proceed ex part*
or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to f
future day, giving notice to the absent party of
the adjournment.
(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure thf
attendance of witnesses before the master by the
issuance and service of subpoenas as provided in
Rule 45. If without adequate excuse a witnesa
fails to appear or give evidence, he may be punished as for a contempt and be subjected to the
consequences, penalties and remedies provided
in Rules 37 and 45.
(3) S t a t e m e n t of a c c o u n t s . When matters of
accounting are in issue before the master, he
may prescribe, the form in which the account*
shall be submitted and in any proper case may
require or receive in evidence a statement by a
certified public accountant who is called as a witness. Upon objection of a party to any of tht
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the
form of statement is insufficient, the master may
require a different form of statement to be furnished, or the accounts or specific items thereof
)untor in
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